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Sharing Shortcomings
Derek E. Bambauer*
Current cybersecurity policy emphasizes increasing the sharing of
threat and vulnerability information. Legal reform is seen as crucial to
enabling this exchange, both within the public and private sectors and
between them. Information sharing is due for some skepticism though,
and this Essay (part of a symposium entitled Privacy in a Data
Collection Society) attempts to provide it. Not only are there few real
legal barriers to data exchange, but greater sharing will generate little
benefit and will create significant privacy risks. This Essay creates a
typography of vertical and horizontal information sharing, and argues
that while top-down communication could be useful, it faces important
practical impediments. The present focus on sharing increases the
scope of the surveillance state unnecessarily and displaces more
effective cybersecurity policy measures.
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................465
I.	
   CRITIQUE .........................................................................................468	
  
A. Illusory Barriers ........................................................................468	
  
B.	
   Uncertain Benefits ....................................................................473	
  
C.	
   Real Risks .................................................................................477	
  
II. CONTROL THE HORIZONTAL. CONTROL THE VERTICAL...................479	
  
III. THE RISKS .......................................................................................482	
  
CONCLUSION..........................................................................................484	
  
INTRODUCTION
Information sharing is trendy in American cybersecurity policy.1

* Professor of Law, James E. Rogers College of Law, University of Arizona. Thanks for
helpful suggestions and discussion are owed to Jane Bambauer, Jennifer Granick, Dan Hunter,
Thinh Nguyen, Sasha Romanosky, Peter Swire, Alexander Tsesis, Tal Zarsky, and the
participants in Privacy in a Data Collection Society at Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
The author welcomes comments at derekbambauer@email.arizona.edu.
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Like all fads, however, the information-sharing trend would benefit
from skeptical analysis to determine whether it is sustainable or
evanescent.2 This Essay argues that information sharing is overrated.
As a method of improving cybersecurity, sharing is unlikely to produce
meaningful benefits, and, indeed, generates potentially significant
privacy harms.3 Policymakers ought to treat it like the pet rock4 rather
than craft beer5 as fads go, and shift their attention to more effective
interventions.6
Information sharing is a major component both of recently enacted
cybersecurity legislation and of bills pending in the current Congress.
For example, in December 2014, President Barack Obama signed a
series of bills intended to bolster security.7 The National Cybersecurity
Protection Act charges the Department of Homeland Security’s (the
“DHS”) National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration
Center with “Federal civilian interface for the multi-directional and
cross-sector sharing of information related to cybersecurity risks,
incidents, analysis, and warnings for Federal and non-Federal entities.”8
1. Cyber Security Bills Focus on Info Sharing, BANKING EXCH. (May 19, 2015), http://www.
bankingexchange.com/news-feed/item/5489-cyber-security-bills-focus-on-info-sharing; Denise E.
Zheng & James A. Lewis, Cyber Threat Information Sharing, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L
STUD. (2015), http://csis.org/files/publication/150310_cyberthreatinfosharing.pdf. It has been
popular in other contexts, such as national security, as well. See, e.g., Peter P. Swire, Privacy and
Information Sharing in the War on Terrorism, 51 VILL. L. REV. 951 (2006).
2. See Amitai Aviram & Avishalom Tor, Overcoming Impediments to Information Sharing, 55
ALA. L. REV. 231 (2004) (assessing barriers to information sharing and evaluating when it is
suboptimal); Sara Sorcher, Obama’s Info-Sharing Plan Won’t Significantly Reduce Security
Breaches, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, http://passcode.csmonitor.com/influencers-infosharing.
3. See Joe Uchill, Cybersecurity Pros Slam Threat Information-Sharing Bills, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Apr. 16, 2015), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/2015/0416/Cybersecuritypros-slam-threat-information-sharing-bills.
4. See Lindsay Bever, Pet Rock Inventor Gary Dahl Dies at 78. He Put a Rock in a Box and
Sold Millions, WASH. POST (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/
wp/2015/04/01/pet-rock-inventor-gary-dahl-dies-at-78/ (describing the pet rock as a “short-lived
fad”).
5. See Daniel Fromson, Idea of the Week: Mapping the Rise of Craft Beer, NEW YORKER
(June 6, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/idea-of-the-week-mapping-the-riseof-craft-beer.
6. See Derek E. Bambauer, Ghost in the Network, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1011 (2014) [hereinafter
Bambauer, Ghost in the Network]; Derek E. Bambauer, Conundrum, 96 MINN. L. REV. 584
(2011) [hereinafter Bambauer, Conundrum]; Nathan A. Sales, Regulating Cyber-Security, 107
NW. U. L. REV. 1503 (2013).
7. Eric Chabrow, Obama Signs 5 Cybersecurity Bills, BANK INFO SECURITY (Dec. 18, 2014),
http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/obama-signs-5-cybersecurity-bills-a-7697/op-1.
8. National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-282, § 3, 128 Stat. 3066,
3067.
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The bill also requires the DHS to submit, within six months,
recommendations to Congress on how to speed up information-sharing
agreements between the government and private sector.9 Similarly, the
Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 requires the National Institute
of Standards and Technology to coordinate its cybersecurity efforts with
Information Sharing and Analysis Centers, which are sector-specific
entities that coordinate sharing of threats and vulnerabilities.10 And the
Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 sets up an
information-security incident center to coordinate information sharing
among federal government agencies.11
Moreover, increasing threat-sharing remains a priority for both the
Obama administration and Congress. In February 2015, the President
issued an executive order designed to increase sharing by private
entities with one another and, on a voluntary basis, with the federal
government.12 CISPA—the proposed Cyber Intelligence Sharing and
Protection Act13—would greatly expand public-private exchange of
cyber threat and vulnerability information,14 and appears to stand a
strong chance of passage15 after both the Sony Pictures attack16 and the
data breach at the Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”).17 In a

9. Id. § 4.
10. Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-274, § 101(b), 128 Stat. 2971,
2972. See generally Information Sharing: A Vital Resource for Critical Infrastructure Security,
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov/information-sharing-vital-resource
(last updated Sept. 17, 2015); About FS-ISAC, FIN. SERVS. INFO. SHARING & ANALYSIS CTR.,
https://www.fsisac.com/about (describing the Financial Services Information Sharing and
Analysis Center (“FS-ISAC”) as “the global financial industry’s go to resource for cyber and
physical threat intelligence analysis and sharing” that “was created by and for members and
operates as a member-owned non profit entity”).
11. Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-283, § 2, 128
Stat. 3073, 3084.
12. Exec. Order No. 13,691, 80 Fed. Reg. 9349 (Feb. 13, 2015).
13. H.R. 234, 114th Cong. (2015).
14. Russell Brandom, CISPA, the Infamous Cybersecurity Bill, Is Headed Back to Congress,
VERGE (Jan. 8, 2015, 3:40 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2015/1/8/7517045/cispa-the-infamouscybersecurity-bill-is-headed-back-to-congress.
15. But see Jennifer Steinhauer, Senate Rejects Measure to Strengthen Cybersecurity, N.Y.
TIMES (June 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/12/us/politics/senate-rejects-measureto-strengthen-cybersecurity.html.
16. Cory Bennett, House Dem Revives Major Cyber Bill, HILL (Jan. 8, 2015, 3:15 PM),
http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/228945-top-house-dem-to-reintroduce-major-cyber-bill.
17. Cf. Ellen Nakashima, Chinese Hack of Federal Personnel Files Included SecurityClearance Database, WASH. POST (June 12, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nati
onal-security/chinese-hack-of-government-network-compromises-security-clearance-files/2015/0
6/12/9f91f146-1135-11e5-9726-49d6fa26a8c6_story.html; Kim Zetter & Andy Greenberg, Why
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publication touting its cybersecurity successes in 2015, the Obama
administration cited a variety of statistics to back its claim that it had
“[s]purred information sharing.”18 While the two major political parties
differ on the specifics of proposed legislation,19 there is a bipartisan
consensus in favor of information sharing as a cybersecurity palliative.20
The more information, the better. That consensus is largely wrong.
This Essay continues with three more Parts. Part I critiques the
favorable perception of information sharing as a cybersecurity
intervention. Part II organizes information sharing conceptually along
horizontal and vertical axes, and argues that while top-down exchange
may make sense theoretically, it suffers from intractable practical
problems. Finally, Part III discusses the risks, particularly to privacy,
from enhanced information sharing.
I. CRITIQUE
There are at least three significant problems with the current policy
focus on information sharing as a palliative—shortcomings that have
not received adequate attention. First, it is not clear that sharing
currently faces meaningful legal barriers that impede efficient
dissemination of data. Proposed reform measures may be solutions in
search of an (evanescent) problem. Second, it is not plain that enhanced
sharing will generate any significant benefits. Finally, it is not certain
that greater sharing is good at all; the practice poses real risks to
privacy. This Part explores these issues.
A. Illusory Barriers
Legislative proposals that bolster information flow depend critically
upon the assumptions that current sharing is suboptimal and that legal
reform can increase dissemination.21 In short, law must be getting in

the OPM Breach Is Such a Security and Privacy Debacle, WIRED (June 11, 2015),
http://www.wired.com/2015/06/opm-breach-security-privacy-debacle/.
18. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: Administration
Cybersecurity Efforts 2015 (July 9, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/07/09/fact-sheet-administration-cybersecurity-efforts-2015.
19. See Steinhauer, supra note 15.
20. See Bambauer, Ghost in the Network, supra note 6, at 1045–47.
21. See Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Creating a “Circle of Trust” to Further Digital
Privacy and Cybersecurity Goals, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1475 (2014). Kesan and Hayes
propose managed information flow between the government and vetted firms using a trusted third
party. Id. Jennifer Granick has written about the legal barriers to the revelation of vulnerability
data more generally. Jennifer Stisa Granick, The Price of Restricting Vulnerability Publications,
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the way of better information.22 This assumption is particularly strong
for proposals such as liability shields for firms that distribute data.23 On
this account, companies would share more, but fear being sued for
violating privacy laws, wiretapping unlawfully, committing torts and
the like.24 Immunity enables sharing, either directly by removing
liability, or indirectly by relieving firms of the threat of plaintiff’s
attorneys motivated by strategic behavior.25 The major source of claims
that legal reform is needed, however, is the regulated entities.26 Indeed,
a Congressional Research Service (“CRS”) study cites, as its principal
evidence of the need for legal reform to produce more sharing, a survey
of information technology security practitioners.27 (Note that the survey
is of information technology staff, who are rarely experts in questions
regarding legal liability.) As scholars such as Jennifer Granick have
noted, every target of government regulation would love immunity from
suit by its consumers, even at the price of aiding the state.28

9 INT’L J. COMM. L. & POL’Y 1 (2005); see also ANDREW NOLAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R43941, CYBERSECURITY AND INFORMATION SHARING: LEGAL CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS
(2015).
22. There is a considerable literature on the economics of information disclosure and the
incentives firms face to divulge data. See, e.g., Ross Anderson & Tyler Moore, The Economics of
Information Security, 314 SCI. 610 (2006); Howard Beales, Richard Craswell & Steven C. Salop,
The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J.L. & ECON. 491 (1981); Mark A. Cohen
& V. Santhakumar, Information Disclosure as Environmental Regulation: A Theoretical
Analysis, 37 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 599 (2007); Michal J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty,
Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers,
19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 45 (2003). For legal sources, see Derek E. Bambauer & Oliver Day, The
Hacker’s Aegis, 60 EMORY L.J. 1051 (2011); and Peter P. Swire, A Theory of Disclosure for
Security and Competitive Reasons: Open Source, Proprietary Software, and Government
Systems, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1333, 1345–79 (2006). I thank Sasha Romanosky for helpful
discussion of this point.
23. See Ellen Nakashima & Katie Zezima, Obama to Propose Legislation to Protect Firms
That Share Cyberthreat Data, WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/obama-proposes-legislation-to-protect-consumer-data-student-privacy/2015/01/12/539c4a
06-9a8f-11e4-bcfb-059ec7a93ddc_story.html.
24. NOLAN, supra note 21.
24. NOLAN, supra note 21.
25. Id. at 48–49.
26. Jennifer Granick, The Right Way to Share Information and Improve Cybersecurity, JUST
SECURITY (Mar. 26, 2015), http://justsecurity.org/21498/share-information-improve-cyber
security/; Nakashima & Zezima, supra note 23.
27. NOLAN, supra note 21, at 5 (“[I]n a recent survey of over 700 information technology
security practitioners, half of the respondents listed worries about ‘potential liability [from]
sharing’ as the main reason for not participating in an initiative for exchanging threat
information.”).
28. Granick, supra note 26.
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However, the assumption that law is part of the problem does not
hold up well to scrutiny. As the CRS study admits, there are few
impediments to intergovernmental exchange of threat information,29 and
there are already myriad mechanisms by which private-sector firms
communicate information about threats and vulnerabilities.30 Vendors
issue bug reports and patches. Independent researchers test software
and report on new exploits.31 Listservs distribute updates. Computer
emergency response teams, such as US-CERT, put out advisories.32
Information sharing and analysis centers coordinate industry-specific
risks.33 Systems administrators talk. Even Facebook has entered the
threat-sharing game.34 The list goes on. The information ecosystem for
cybersecurity appears to be diverse and thriving.35 Policymakers have
not elucidated concrete examples of threats where further information
could have prevented harm, or where there are structural weaknesses in
existing flows.
The purported greatest concern for law as impediment—that private
sector entities fail to reveal useful data to government agencies due to
liability fears—also proves illusory when analyzed. The CRS study
carefully lists the set of regulations that might deter private-public
sharing: federal wiretapping law, industry-specific privacy rules,
antitrust law, tort and contract law, and baroque causes of action, such

29. See Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 211, 223–26 (2015) (describing
how the executive branch used multiple sources of authority and agencies to address
cybersecurity concerns). But see Keir X. Bancroft, Regulating Information Security in the
Government Contracting Industry: Will the Rising Tide Lift All Boats?, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1145,
1199–1200 (2013) (suggesting greater sharing of information about security compliance across
agencies to reduce contractors’ costs).
30. Patrick Eddington, OPM, CISA, and the Cybersecurity Oxymoron, JUST SECURITY (July 2,
2015), http://justsecurity.org/24360/opm-cisa-cybersecurity-oxymoron/.
31. See, e.g., Why Veracode?, VERACODE, http://www.veracode.com/about/why-veracode
(last visited Nov. 18, 2015).
32. Id.; see 2015 Alerts, US-CERT, https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts (last visited Nov. 18,
2015). But see Terrence K. Kelly & Jeffrey Hunker, Cyber Policy: Institutional Struggle in a
Transformed World, 8 I/S 211, 229–33 (2012) (criticizing the U.S. Computer Emergency Ready
Team for its failure to provide more tailored information sharing).
33. See, e.g., About Us, NH-ISAC, http://www.nhisac.org/about-us/ (last visited Nov. 18,
2015) (“National Health Information Sharing and Analysis Center”).
34. Ron Miller, New Facebook Threat-Sharing Project Sees Safety in Herd, TECHCRUNCH
(Feb. 11, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/02/11/new-facebook-threat-sharing-project-seessafety-in-herd/.
35. See L. Jean Camp, The State of Economics of Information Security, 2 I/S 189, 195 (2006)
(“[R]esearch has verified that information sharing is both economically valuable and a
complement to security investment.”).
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as shareholder derivative suits.36 These legal regimes may cause angst
for information technology staff, and perhaps for the lawyers in their
general counsel’s office. But the concerns are quickly dispelled.
The three sections of the federal wiretapping statute—the Wiretap
Act,37 the Stored Communications Act,38 and the Pen Register Act39—
have exceptions that protect most, if not all, relevant sharing. The
Wiretap Act and Stored Communications Act cover only the content of
communications (not routing data),40 and relieve liability where one
party consents to the disclosure.41 Firms such as Internet Service
Providers (“ISPs”) can protect themselves via contract with customers,
generating consent, and via analyzing only non-content data. As a
practical matter, even if firms unlawfully divulge content data to one
another or to the government, affected consumers will have scant
opportunity to detect the disclosure. And, the exception that enables
providers to disclose contents to protect their rights or property seems
amenable to gaming—providers could potentially enter into reciprocal
security data-sharing agreements, and then disclose threat information
as a necessary incident to protecting their rights under those
agreements.42 The Pen Register Act has similar exceptions,43 and
applies only to non-content data.44
The various bespoke privacy regimes, such as the Video Privacy
Protection Act45 and Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act,46 govern
sensitive data like personally identifiable information (“PII”), but are
unlikely to come into play. Information about one’s video rental habits
or age is not particularly helpful as cyber threat data. For antitrust, the
Department of Justice has issued a policy statement clarifying that
antitrust law is not an impediment to sharing.47 Tort and contract law

36. NOLAN, supra note 21, at 13–33.
37. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22 (2012).
38. Id. §§ 2701–12.
39. Id. §§ 3121–27.
40. Id. §§ 2511(1)(c), 2701(a).
41. Id. §§ 2511(2)(c), 2701(c)(2).
42. Cf. Id. §§ 2511(2)(a)(i), 2702(b)(5).
43. Id. § 3121(b)(1)–(2).
44. Id. § 3127(3)–(4) (defining both pen register and trap and trace device).
45. Id. § 2710.
46. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–06 (2012).
47. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice, Federal Trade Commission
Issue Antitrust Policy Statement on Sharing of Cybersecurity Information (Apr. 10, 2014),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/305027.pdf.
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have been almost a complete failure as a cause of action regarding both
data breaches and deliberate disclosures;48 its weakness is much
bemoaned by legal scholars.49 Finally, causes of action such as
shareholder suits are founded not on disclosure, but rather on a failure
of a duty of care on the part of directors and officers.50 Thus, liability
stems not from sharing information, but from a lack of care on the part
of the corporation, such as a data breach where the disclosed data serves
as evidence of the alleged lack of care.51 That is a remote risk from
sharing.
Moreover, risks of liability have hardly impaired private sector
sharing—transactions of private information are routine,52 causing
considerable outrage among privacy advocates.53 Private organizations
may purport to be reluctant to share data with the government, but they
do not hesitate to share it with one another, particularly for profit.
In short, law is not a meaningful impediment to increased exchange
of threat and vulnerability information, either across the public and
private sectors or between entities within one of them.

48. See Sasha Romanosky, David Hoffman, & Alessandro Acquisti, Empirical Analysis of
Data Breach Litigation, 11 J. EMP. LEGIS. STUD. 74 (2014) (finding that while 50% of breach
suits settle, the awards are usually only nominal damages and only to named plaintiffs); see also
Derek E. Bambauer, Rules, Standards, and Geeks, 5 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 49, 58
(2011); L. Jean Camp & Catherine Wolfram, Pricing Security: A Market in Vulnerabilities, in
ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION SECURITY 18–22 (L. Jean Camp & Stephen Lewis eds., 2004);
Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private Law at the
Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241 (2007); Michael D. Scott, Tort Liability for
Vendors of Insecure Software: Has the Time Finally Come?, 67 MD. L. REV. 425 (2008).
49. See, e.g., Citron, supra note 48, at 262–68; Vincent R. Johnson, Credit-Monitoring
Damages in Cybersecurity Tort Litigation, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 113 (2011); Felix T. Wu,
Defining Privacy and Utility in Data Sets, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1117, 1161–62 (2013).
50. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (discussing duty of care to
shareholders).
51. NOLAN, supra note 21, at 30.
52. See Natasha Singer, You For Sale, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2012, at BU1; see Megan Geuss,
FTC Proposes a Compromise So RadioShack Can Sell Consumer Data, ARS TECHNICA (May 18,
2015, 1:10 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/05/ftc-proposes-a-compromise-so-radio
shack-can-sell-consumer-data/; Emma Thomasson, Mastercard: Real-Time Consumer Trend
Data Is a Huge Growth Area for Us, BUS. INSIDER (Jun. 11, 2014, 10:25 AM), http://www.bus
inessinsider.com/r-mastercard-expects-big-growth-from-big-data-insights-2014-11.
53. See Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193
(1998); Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Three Paradoxes of Big Data, 66 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 41 (2013), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-and-big-data/three-paradox
es-big-data; Electronic Privacy Information Center, Judge Approves Laughably Bad, Collusive
Class Action Settlement, EPIC (Apr. 3, 2015), https://epic.org/2015/04/judge-approves-laughablybad-c.html.
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B. Uncertain Benefits
Increased information sharing probably will not help cybersecurity
much.54 The pro-sharing argument rests on at least three key
assumptions. First, the entity receiving cyberthreat information can and
will act upon it. Second, the shared data is reliable. Finally, the volume
of threat information is manageable for recipients. Each of these
assumptions is uncertain at best.
First, organizations may not be able to make use of updates. It is
difficult to reliably quantify cyberattack patterns.55 But, at least some
meaningful number of them—including the high-profile hack of
sensitive data at the federal OPM56—occurred when attackers exploited
known vulnerabilities.57 If an exploit targets a known, patched bug,
then more information likely makes little to no difference. Perhaps
firms might use data about the prevalence of exploits to prioritize the
order in which to apply patches, but studies show that many bugs
remain unpatched for at least a year.58 Firms delay implementation due
to the need to test patches, to ensure interoperability with other code,
and to manage resource constraints with their information technology
54. See Josephine Wolff, Cybersecurity Legislation Is Too Short-Sighted, SLATE (Apr. 29,
2015, 11:05 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2015/04/29/pcna_cisa_information_
sharing_cybersecurity_legislation_is_too_short_sighted.html.
55. Attack statistics are notoriously unreliable. For example, some reported data show that the
state of Utah is subject to more attacks per day than the Department of Defense, which seems
unlikely. Brian Fung, How Many Cyberattacks Hit the United States Last Year?, NEXTGOV (Mar.
8, 2013), http://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2013/03/how-many-cyberattacks-hit-united-stat
es-last-year/61775/. There are services that attempt to track attacks in real time. Brian Krebs,
Who’s Attacking Whom? Realtime Attack Trackers, KREBS ON SECURITY (Jan. 5, 2015), http://
krebsonsecurity.com/2015/01/whos-attacking-whom-realtime-attack-trackers/. And PricewaterhouseCoopers, which issues a widely used cyberattack report, bases its data on surveys. PWC,
US CYBERCRIME: RISING RISKS, REDUCED READINESS (2014), http://www.pwc.com/en_US/
us/increasing-it-effectiveness/publications/assets/pwc-2014-us-state-of-cybercrime.pdf; see Cory
Bennett, Study: Cyberattacks Up 48 Percent in 2014, HILL (Oct. 27, 2014), http://thehill.com/
policy/cybersecurity/221936-study-cyber-attacks-up-48-percent-in-2014.
56. See Sean Gallagher, Why the “Biggest Government Hack Ever” Got Past the Feds, ARS
TECHNICA (June 8, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/06/why-the-biggestgovernment-hack-ever-got-past-opm-dhs-and-nsa/.
57. See, e.g., Brian Krebs, The Long Tail of ColdFusion Fail, KREBS ON SECURITY (Mar. 17,
2014, 12:15 PM), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/03/the-long-tail-of-coldfusion-fail/#more-25
158; Snapchat Warned Before Hack About Vulnerability, HERE & NOW (Jan. 3, 2014), http://here
andnow.wbur.org/2014/01/03/snapchat-security-breach. See generally Bambauer, Ghost in the
Network, supra note 6, at 1050–52 (describing why organizations remain vulnerable to the
“known unknowns” of vulnerabilities with patches).
58. See, e.g., Arik Hesseldahl, Why the Federal Government Sucks at Cyber Security,
RE/CODE (June 23, 2015), http://recode.net/2015/06/23/why-the-federal-government-sucks-at-cy
bersecurity/; see also Sales, supra note 6, at 1517.
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staff.59 Even if the shared information is useful, it still has to be used to
make a difference.
The situation is worse for attacks against unknown weaknesses (zeroday exploits). Here, information is useless by definition: defenders
simply do not know about the vulnerability, nor do they have the
capability to protect themselves even if they learn about it.60 Once the
data are analyzed, hopefully a weakness (in the zero-day) can be found,
along with a signature added to targets’ intrusion-detection systems.61
Until then, however, information sharing is irrelevant for zero-days.
Thus, sharing becomes useful only in a subset of circumstances:
those where some targets (such as firms or government agencies) know
about vulnerabilities, but others do not, and where the uninformed could
engage in remediation if they knew more.62 Reliable data on how often
this occurs are lacking. However, this seems like a narrow range of
cases:, where the exploit is imperfectly known, the remedy is ready at
hand, and targets are capable of applying the fix without meaningful
delay.
Next, there are reasons to be skeptical about the quality of the
information that gets shared. There are risks from unreliability:
irrelevant data clogs the system, and inaccurate data damages it. If the
threat information is not cogent for the recipient, it consumes time and
attention that should be devoted to relevant threats. And patches for
nonexistent vulnerabilities can introduce their own flaws and impair
functionality.
National security threat sharing provides a cautionary tale about
information quality. After the attacks of September 11, 2001,
governments at all levels were determined to reduce purported barriers
to sharing of intelligence.63 With the passage of the Homeland Security
Act of 2002, the federal government established a set of nationwide
fusion centers to share threat data with state and local governments.64
59. Sales, supra note 6, at 1508.
60. See Leyla Bilge & Tudor Dumitras, Before We Knew It: An Empirical Study of Zero-Day
Attacks in the Real World, 19 PROC. 2012 ACM CONF. ON COMPUTER & COMM. SECURITY 833
(2012), http://users.ece.cmu.edu/~tdumitra/public_documents/bilge12_zero_day.pdf.
61. See Kaspersky Lab Discovered and Blocked Zero-Day Vulnerability in Adobe Flash
Player, KASPERSKY LAB (May 5, 2014), http://www.kaspersky.com/about/news/virus/2014/kas
persky-lab-discovered-and-blocked-zero-day-vulnerability-in-adobe-flash-player.
62. See Bambauer, Ghost in the Network, supra note 6, at 1041, 1050–52.
63. See Torin Monaghan & Priscilla M. Regan, Zones of Opacity: Data Fusion in Post-9/11
Security Organizations, 27 CANADIAN J.L. & SOC’Y 301 (2012).
64. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§ 891–99, 116 Stat. 2135, 2252–
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DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano described the fusion centers as “one of
the centerpieces of our counterterrorism strategy.”65 The centers have
reportedly processed over 22,000 suspicious activity reports, at an
estimated cost of at least $289 million.66 However, a bipartisan report
by an investigatory subcommittee of the Senate Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee found no evidence that fusion centers
identified a single terrorist threat or contributed in any way to disrupting
an active terrorist plot.67 The centers generally produced “irrelevant,
useless, or inappropriate intelligence reporting . . . and many produced
no intelligence reporting whatsoever.”68 Frequently, however, the
centers shared information that “endanger[ed] citizens’ civil liberties.”69
The centers not only failed to improve national security, but they
consumed resources that could have been devoted to efforts that
actually produced value.70
Even if information on threats to
cybersecurity proves to be more reliable than data on threats to national
security, there will inevitably be problems of quality. And while some
information technology personnel are sufficiently expert to sift the
useful from the useless, not all of them can do so reliably. Those
problems may be greater than the value that sharing provides—as with
the fusion centers.
Lastly, a system for processing vulnerability and threat notifications
must contend with significant challenges related to volume.71 The sheer
daily number of cyberattacks, even just on government networks, is
staggering.72 Administrators will have to determine what information
58.
65. U.S. SENATE COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, PERMANENT
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS, FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR AND INVOLVEMENT IN STATE AND
LOCAL FUSION CENTERS 2 (2012) [hereinafter SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS].
66. Id. at 3; Robert O’Harrow Jr., DHS ‘Fusion Centers’ Portrayed as Pools of Ineptitude and
Civil Liberties Intrusions, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigat
ions/dhs-fusion-centers-portrayed-as-pools-of-ineptitude-and-civil-liberties-intrusions/2012/10/02
/10014440-0cb1-11e2-bd1a-b868e65d57eb_story.html.
67. SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 65, at 2.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1.
70. See generally Priscilla M. Regan & Torin Monahan, Beyond Counterterrorism: Data
Sharing, Privacy, and Organizational Histories of DHS Fusion Centers, 5 INT’L J. E-POL. 1
(2013); O’Harrow, supra note 66.
71. See Andrea Castillo, Cybersecurity Bill More Likely to Promote Information Overload
than Prevent Cyberattacks, Congress Blog, HILL (May 7, 2015, 1:00 PM), http://thehill.com/
blogs/congress-blog/homeland-security/241242-cybersecurity-bill-more-likely-to-promote-inform
ation.
72. See, e.g., Bob Orr, Pentagon Expands Cyber Defense Against Daily Attacks, CBS NEWS
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about these attacks to share, and with whom. That requires difficult
judgments about which attacks are noteworthy or new, but in the
absence of those judgments, the volume of information would be
overwhelming for recipients. Threat information is most valuable when
it is not yet known to the recipient, although warnings about existing
threats might help entities prioritize dealing with them. Analytics
software, such as that produced by Palantir, can aid in the task, but it is
limited by the quality of its algorithms and the patterns identified as
meaningful by its users.73 The sheer quantity of attack data is a
potentially insuperable problem. As security expert Bruce Schneier has
written, the answer to the problem of finding a needle in a haystack is
not to add more hay.74
Importantly, the government may not pass on some vulnerability
information that is useful to targets, because that data is useful for
offensive purposes as well as defensive ones.75 Firms such as Microsoft
have begun revealing details on vulnerabilities with the government
before either releasing them to customers or patching them.76 If the
government learns of a new zero-day attack against the Microsoft
Windows operating system, the state can alert firms and agencies to the
vulnerability—or weaponize it for espionage or surveillance purposes.77
The recent attack on the security firm Hacking Team demonstrated that
agencies such as the FBI and Drug Enforcement Agency purchased the
company’s software, which exploits vulnerabilities in mobile phone
operating systems and Microsoft’s BitLocker encryption technology.78
They bought it not to make those programs more secure, but to break
(Feb. 6, 2013, 7:34 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/pentagon-expands-cyber-defense-amiddaily-attacks/; Ed Sperling, Ten Million Cyberattacks a Day, FORBES (Aug. 9, 2010, 6:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/2010/08/06/internet-government-security-technology-cio-network-cyberattacks.html.
73. See Cyber Security, PALANTIR, https://www.palantir.com/solutions/cyber/ (last visited
Nov. 18, 2015).
74. Bruce Schneier, Why Data Mining Won’t Stop Terror, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Mar. 9,
2005), https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2005/03/why_data_mining_wont.html.
75. See Eddington, supra note 30; Mailyn Fidler, Regulating the Zero-Day Vulnerability
Trade: A Preliminary Analysis, I/S (forthcoming 2015–16), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/
groups/is/files/2015/06/Fidler-Second-Review-Changes-Made.pdf.
76. Michael Riley, U.S. Agencies Said to Swap Data with Thousands of Firms, BLOOMBERG
(June 14, 2013, 11:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-06-14/u-s-agenciessaid-to-swap-data-with-thousands-of-firms.
77. Fidler, supra note 75 (manuscript at 6–7).
78. Thomas Fox-Brewster, Leaked Emails: How Hacking Team and US Government Want to
Break Web Encryption Together, FORBES (July 6, 2015, 2:29 PM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/thomasbrewster/2015/07/06/us-gov-likes-hacking-team/.
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into them. The FBI issued a statement in response to the revelation
about its relationship with Hacking Team that reads, “the FBI routinely
identifies, evaluates, and tests potential exploits in the interest of cyber
security.”79 Put simply, the government already deliberately fails to
share information about known vulnerabilities, because those
weaknesses are useful for purposes other than cybersecurity. Enhanced
sharing may simply improve the state’s ability to monitor
communications.
This divided loyalty is most evident in the mission of the
government’s most expert cybersecurity entity, the National Security
Agency (“NSA”). The NSA has two missions. One is to secure the
country’s communications systems, and the second is to monitor those
systems (and those of foreign nations).80 Those goals are fundamentally
in tension. Vulnerability information can be used to advance only one
of them. There is no practical way to limit patches to U.S. systems
alone; eliminating a vulnerability for one user inevitably makes it
available to all of them. The NSA has to decide whether to improve
America’s cybersecurity or to engage in better surveillance. Thus, it
will not share all of the vulnerability information it receives.
Conventional wisdom among policymakers is that information
sharing is critical to improving cybersecurity. However, the benefits are
likely overstated, perhaps significantly so.81 Even if this approach does
offer value, it may not be advisable to adopt it. Cybersecurity efforts
are a zero sum game: resources spent sharing information cannot be
used for education, prevention, or resilience.82 Supporters of enhanced
exchange have yet to make a rigorous case for adopting it instead of
other measures.
C. Real Risks
Enhanced sharing of information with government entities creates
real risks. Threat and vulnerability information will at times contain
PII, such as IP addresses, e-mail addresses, or URLs for sites such as
Facebook.83 There are at least two risks from the accumulation of data

79. Id. (quoting statement from FBI’s Quantico office).
80. Mission, NAT’L SECURITY AGENCY, https://www.nsa.gov/about/mission/index.shtml (last
visted Nov. 18, 2015).
81. See Bambauer, Ghost in the Network, supra note 6, at 1045–47.
82. See Bambauer, Conundrum, supra note 6, at 635–67.
83. See Stewart Baker, Why the House Information-Sharing Bill Could Actually Deter
Information Sharing, WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
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that includes PII. The government may misuse the information. For
example, the fusion centers run by the DHS reported on activities by
people that were expressly protected by the First Amendment, such as a
motivational talk to a Muslim organization about good parenting
techniques and a lecture at a mosque.84 And, even if state agencies only
employ data for legitimate purposes, merely retaining the information
creates risks for subjects, because the government can also be hacked.
The recent OPM breach revealed sensitive information of 20 million
people85, and this sort of hack is increasingly the norm rather than the
exception.86 A vulnerability database with PII would make an attractive
target for attackers.87
This risk is compounded by private firms, who are likely to overshare
under an immunity regime. A number of legislative proposals would
shield firms from liability based on information shared with the
government.88 If that information contains PII for the firms’ customers,
or especially third parties, liability sets up worrisome incentives. Any
privacy harms from that sharing would fall solely on the subjects of the
PII: the firms would be protected.89 Thus, if firms gain any benefit
from sharing data, they will do so without balancing those advantages
against harms. This also affects the level of precautions firms are likely
to take in scrubbing data of PII before disclosing it. Firms with no
downside from revealing PII are unlikely to invest in removing it from

volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/03/30/why-the-house-information-sharing-bill-could-actually-deterinformation-sharing/; Andy Greenberg, CISA Cybersecurity Bill Advances Despite Privacy
Concerns, WIRED (Mar. 12, 2015, 7:18 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/03/cisa-cybersecuritybill-advances-despite-privacy-critiques/.
84. SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 65, at 38.
85. Cory Bennett, Lawmakers Look to Strip OPM Powers After Hack, HILL (July 12, 2015,
6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/247593-lawmakers-look-to-strip-opm-powersafter-hack.
86. See Chris Frates & Curt Devine, Government Hacks and Security Breaches Skyrocket,
CNN (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/19/politics/government-hacks-and-securitybreaches-skyrocket/.
87. See Nuala O’Connor, Why the OPM Data Breach Is Unlike Any Other, CDT (June 22,
2015), https://cdt.org/blog/why-the-opm-data-breach-is-unlike-any-other/ (“[E]xpanded sharing is
especially worrisome for data security because the bill permits unprepared agencies to receive
data (rather than direct all sharing at a secure entity such as the DHS National Cybersecurity and
Communications Integration Center), and contains only a weak requirement to strip personal
information prior to sharing.”).
88. See Andy Greenberg, House Passes Cybersecurity Bill Despite Privacy Protests, WIRED
(Apr. 22, 2015, 5:38 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/04/house-passes-cybersecurity-bill-desp
ite-privacy-protests/.
89. See Nakashima & Zezima, supra note 23.
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data.
Collecting information with PII has little offsetting security value.
This data does not help determine the magnitude, novelty, or even
origin of threats. Information about the source of threats, for example,
is often contested, uncertain, or flatly wrong.90 Experts are still
uncertain about the source of the cyberattacks on Estonia in May 2007
and South Korea in 200991—not to mention the entity responsible for
the Sony Pictures hack.92 Even if an attack originates from the
computer or account of a single individual, it is likely that that person’s
credentials were compromised, as opposed to his being the true source
of the threat.93 Thus, sharing data with PII creates risks to privacy with
little to no offsetting benefit for security.
This Part’s critique undermines three key arguments in favor of
bolstering information sharing. It shows that there are few, if any, legal
barriers that impede exchange, that greater sharing will likely produce
little benefit, and that more data flow creates significant risks to privacy.
II. CONTROL THE HORIZONTAL. CONTROL THE VERTICAL.94
It can be helpful conceptually to organize information-sharing
regimes along two dimensions: the horizontal and the vertical.
Horizontal sharing occurs among similarly situated entities—firms or
federal agencies of roughly the same size in the same industry. Vertical
sharing occurs among entities at different levels or with significantly
different capabilities, such as between federal and local government
agencies, or large corporations and small businesses in a sector. While

90. See Bambauer, Conundrum, supra note 6, at 589–90, 596–98; Benjamin Brake, Strategic
Risks of Ambiguity in Cyberspace, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Oct. 22, 2015),
http://www.cfr.org/cybersecurity/strategic-risks-ambiguity-cyberspace/p36541.
91. See Bambauer, Ghost in the Network, supra note 6, at 1050.
92. See Timothy B. Lee, The Sony Hack: How it Happened, Who Is Responsible, and What
We’ve Learned, VOX (Dec. 17, 2014, 9:00 PM), http://www.vox.com/2014/12/14/7387945/sonyhack-explained; Dana Tamir, Who Hacked Sony? New Report Raises More Questions About
Scandalous Breach, SECURITY INTELLIGENCE (Feb. 5, 2015), https://securityintelligence.com/
who-hacked-sony-new-report-raises-more-questions-about-scandalous-breach/; Jane Wakefield,
Whodunnit? The Mystery of the Sony Pictures Hack, BBC (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.
bbc.com/news/technology-30530361.
93. Increasingly, targeted spear phishing attacks trick employees into revealing their
credentials. See Kim Zetter, Hacker Lexicon: What Are Phishing and Spear Phishing?, WIRED
(Apr. 7, 2015, 6:09 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/04/hacker-lexicon-spear-phishing/ (relating
the details of the successful spear phishing attack against RSA in 2011).
94. With apologies to the television series The Outer Limits, which opened with a voice-over
that included the lines, “We will control the horizontal. We will control the vertical.”
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the mapping is rough, it is likely useful.95 In particular, it suggests that
while horizontal sharing may be useful, vertical sharing—the focus of
much of cybersecurity policy and proposed legislation—is not likely to
be of value.
The horizontal exchange of security data among peer firms in an
industry, or government actors at a given level, probably makes sense.96
These entities likely face similar threats and operational constraints, and
probably have roughly equivalent resources to deploy for prevention
and countermeasures.97 And, they are likely to understand what data
will be pertinent for their counterparts, and what steps their peers can
reasonably take.98 For example, a large firm that reveals a new
signature for an intrusion detection system (“IDS”) generates
measurable benefit for peers using the IDS, but no benefit for small
firms that do not.99 In particular, firms in industries that use customized
software, such as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(“SCADA”) packages in utility companies, may be able to provide
highly relevant vulnerability data to one another.100 Similarly, advice
that is applicable to a Fortune 500 company with a specialized
information security team will not be useful to smaller organizations
that do not have dedicated security resources.101 Put simply, peers are

95. There are of course some tricky definitional questions in this simple matrix: are small
firms in different industries more or less similar than a small firm and a large one in a given
sector? Like any model, this one sacrifices some precision to offer some generalizable insights.
96. See Miller, supra note 34.
97. See generally J.D. Harrison, Small Business Leaders Urge Congress to Rethink
Cybersecurity Measures, WASH. POST (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
on-small-business/wp/2015/04/23/small-business-leaders-urge-congress-to-rethink-cybersecuritymeasures/.
98. See S. Kumar, Why Small Firms Mean Big Business for Cybersecurity, FORTUNE (May
20, 2015, 11:25 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/05/20/cybersecurity-small-business/.
99. There are excellent intrusion detection systems that are open source and thus available at
no cost. See, e.g., SNORT, https://www.snort.org/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2015). However, even
free software requires information technology personnel to install, configure, and maintain it.
Security expert John Viega argues that IDS “is only a good investment for the largest 5% of
companies.” John Viega, Why Most Companies Shouldn’t Run Intrusion Detection, O’REILLY:
COMMUNITY (Dec. 4, 2008), http://broadcast.oreilly.com/2008/12/why-most-companies-shouldntru.html.
100. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 21 STEPS TO IMPROVE CYBER SECURITY OF SCADA
NETWORKS 3 (2007), http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/21_Steps__SCADA.pdf (describing use of SCADA software in utilities’ networks).
101. See Kelly Jackson Higgins, Stuxnet Expert Proposes New Framework for ICS/SCADA
Security, DARK READING (Sept. 4, 2013, 6:02 PM), http://www.darkreading.com/stuxnet-expertproposes-new-framework-for-ics-scada-security/d/d-id/1140411? (citing security expert Ralph
Langner, who estimates that very few critical infrastructure operators have even one information
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more likely to share information that is relevant to their counterparts’
cybersecurity environments, and that they can act upon once informed.
Upwards vertical sharing makes less sense, at least theoretically.
Entities could share upwards—from smaller to larger firms, from local
to state to federal government, and from the private sector to the public.
This sharing, though, suffers from the problem of the information
flood.102 Organizations higher in the hierarchy will receive redundant
information, and probably some that is irrelevant. Attention economics
apply to this problem with full force.103 Lower-level entities will
generally not be able to determine what data is relevant to higher-level
ones, and thus cannot be depended upon to do some of the necessary
filtering. Vulnerabilities in bespoke software probably are not useful to
anyone other than the owner.104 And it is not clear that round-trip
dissemination of vulnerability information—for example, from a firm in
one industry to the federal government to a firm in a second industry—
is more likely or more efficient than either horizontal sharing or
notifying the relevant vendor.
Downwards sharing, such as from federal agencies like the NSA or
DHS to private organizations, makes more sense conceptually.105
Within an industry, larger firms may be better positioned to analyze
data and detect trends.106 Expert government agencies could potentially
play the same role.107 However, important information asymmetries
plague this possibility as well. Larger companies or expert agencies
likely know little about a given recipient’s particular needs or
capabilities. Information sharing risks being too specific, by providing
security person on their staff); Kumar, supra note 98.
102. See Castillo, supra note 71.
103. See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Michael H. Goldhaber, Attention Shoppers!,
WIRED (Dec. 1, 1997, 12:00 PM), http://archive.wired.com/wired/archive/5.12/es_attention.html.
104. See generally Scott, supra note 48; Microsoft Security Intelligence Report, Vulnerability
Subprocess, http://www.microsoft.com/security/sir/story/default.aspx#!0day_subprocess.
105. But see Steven M. Bellovin et al., Can It Really Work? Problems with Extending
EINSTEIN 3 to Critical Infrastructure, 3 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 1 (2011) (explaining why the
EINSTEIN threat detection system in use on government networks will not function adequately
on private networks).
106. See Miller, supra note 34; Fahmida Y. Rashid, Microsoft Releases Threat Information
Sharing Framework, SECURITY WEEK (Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.securityweek.com/microsoftreleases-threat-information-sharing-framework.
107. See, e.g., Michael Rogers, Dir., Nat’l Sec. Agency, Remarks at the NSA Event: Sharing
Cyber Threat Information to Protect Business and America (Oct. 28, 2014) (transcript available at
https://www.nsa.gov/public_info/speeches_testimonies/28oct14_dirnsa.shtml) (discussing role of
the NSA in information sharing).
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detailed yet irrelevant information; too general, by providing broad
advice or vulnerability data on platforms such as Microsoft Windows
that are already covered by the vendor; or both. Descriptively, there
appears to be relatively little downward sharing between government
and the private sector at present, even though fewer privacy concerns
arise when information flows in the opposite direction.108 And, it is
unclear why government agencies would be better or faster sources of
cybersecurity information than vendors, peers, security firms, or
independent researchers.
Information-sharing approaches can be usefully organized along
horizontal and vertical dimensions. Horizontal sharing among similarly
sized or situated entities makes sense, but appears to be taking place
already. Vertical sharing risks flooding recipients with inapposite
information. In both cases, it is not clear why government intervention
is currently necessary.
III. THE RISKS
Current vertical information-sharing proposals create risks that are
not balanced by the minimal security benefits they would offer. First, to
borrow Paul Ohm’s term, these initiatives would help the government
construct the Database of Ruin, and use it for purposes far beyond
securing U.S. networks.109 For example, the Cybersecurity Information
Sharing Act (“CISA”) of 2015 has several features that create risk.110
First, private entities that share information with the government receive
immunity from civil actions based on that disclosure, even if the data
contains PII.111 Second, if the government archives the information, it
can use it for a wide range of law enforcement purposes—including
prosecution of trade secret misappropriation, identity theft, and the
sexual exploitation of minors—in addition to employing it to enhance
cybersecurity.112 In theory, PII must be purged from information that is
shared, but the combination of immunity and law enforcement usage
108. Steven Norton, CIOs Say Cybersecurity Information Sharing Has a Long Way to Go,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 6, 2015, 4:23 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2015/04/06/cios-say-cybersecurit
y-information-sharing-has-a-long-way-to-go/.
109. See Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1746 (2010) (defining the “database of ruin” as “the
worldwide collection of all of the facts held by third parties that can be used to cause privacyrelated harm to almost every member of society”).
110. S. 754, 114th Cong. (2015).
111. Id. § 6(b); see Castillo, supra note 71.
112. S. 754 § 5(d)(5)(A)(vi).
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raises questions about how effective such purging is likely to be.113
And, of course, the information can be shared without the consent of the
data subject. Scholars raise the concern that measures like CISA, rather
than being effective measures in the surge towards cybersecurity, are
instead intended as a component of the national security state’s
surveillance regime.114 And the myriad recent data breaches at federal
agencies demonstrates that the risks from governmental storage of
information are not limited to official action—cybersecurity threat data
will be attractive to attackers as well.115 In short, current policy
encourages the government to accumulate data profligately, where it
may be subject to misuse by state actors or to misappropriation by
crackers.
Second, a more subtle threat is that the fetish for information sharing
may politically displace more effective cybersecurity measures.116
Data-sharing policy initiatives are attractive because they are relatively
uncontroversial; while civil liberties groups object to CISA and its kin,
information technology firms have little to lose and potentially much to
gain from such legislation.117 The proposals do not require any
substantive security steps by private entities, and while they may create
some information management burden for federal agencies such as the

113. Id. § 4(d)(2); see Eddington, supra note 30.
114. See, e.g., Jennifer Granick, Sloppy Cyber Threat Sharing Is Surveillance by Another
Name, JUST SECURITY (June 29, 2015, 9:23 AM), http://justsecurity.org/24261/sloppy-cyberthreat-sharing-surveillance/. See generally Omer Tene, A New Harm Matrix for Cybersecurity
Surveillance, 12 COLO. TECH. L.J. 391 (2014).
115. Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Hacking of Government Computers Exposed 21.5 Million People,
N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/10/us/office-of-personnel-manage
ment-hackers-got-data-of-millions.html; Jack Moore, The Year of the Breach: 10 Federal Agency
Data Breaches in 2014, NEXTGOV (Dec. 30, 2014), http://www.nextgov.com/cybersec
urity/2014/12/year-breach-10-federal-agency-data-breaches-2014/102066/; Jai Vijayan, 4 Worst
Government Data Breaches of 2014, INFO. WEEK (Dec. 11, 2014, 9:06 AM), http://www.inform
ationweek.com/government/cybersecurity/4-worst-government-data-breaches-of-2014/d/d-id/131
8061.
116. Political scientist John Kingdon uses the model of a “policy window,” in which there is a
limited period of political salience for reform on an issue to be completed before the window
closes. JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES (2d ed. 2010); cf.
Peter Sloan, The Reasonable Information Security Program, 21 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2 (2014)
(describing model information security plan that meets reasonableness requirements under
various statutory regimes).
117. See O’Connor, supra note 87; Chris O’Brien, Cyber Security Bill Pits Tech Giants
Against Privacy Activists, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/apr/12/
business/la-fi-cybersecurity-bill-20130413; Stop the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Bills,
EFF, https://act.eff.org/action/stop-the-cybersecurity-information-sharing-bills (last visited Nov.
18, 2015).
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DHS, they do not require those organizations to do much beyond
storing and sharing the information at their discretion. Information
sharing is politically popular because it is relatively undemanding and
appears to respond to a salient problem. The risk, though, is that
passage of CISA or a similar bill will cause Congress and policymakers
to turn their attention to other issues, even though significant
cybersecurity problems remain.
Current information-sharing approaches thus create risks to privacy,
by accumulating a storehouse of sensitive personal information, and to
cybersecurity itself, by crowding out more controversial yet more
effective measures.
CONCLUSION
Information sharing is a relatively easy answer to the difficult
problems of cybersecurity. The challenge is that it is the wrong answer.
While augmenting the exchange of threat and vulnerability data is cheap
and intuitively appealing, it is also flawed at both theoretical and
practical levels. The current focus on sharing is understandable, since it
responds to a felt need to do something about cybersecurity in the wake
of numerous high-profile breaches and attacks, and because it faces
little opposition from stakeholders. But, like most worthwhile reforms,
policy changes that make real progress in cybersecurity will come at a
meaningful political cost. Measures that increase information flow
create the appearance of useful change.118 But that is a dangerous
illusion: it abates the pressure to improve the security of systems and
networks without producing any real benefit.119
The sharing obsession not only crowds out more effective
interventions, it places potentially sensitive information at risk for little
benefit. Several of the proposed legislative measures, such as CISA,
expand the use of shared information beyond cybersecurity to standard
law enforcement. While firms and government entities are supposed to
expunge PII before release, there are no standards for so doing, and
little practical likelihood of liability for a failure to comply. And, these
risks come with scant countervailing benefit: there are no meaningful
legal barriers to enhanced exchange at present, and more data may not
help recipients who are flooded with information and limited in their

118. See Amitai Aviram, The Placebo Effect of Law: Law’s Role in Manipulating
Perceptions, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 54 (2006).
119. Cf. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 21, at 1545–47.
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cybersecurity resources.
The exchange of threat information works reasonably well at present,
and the government should concentrate on more effective responses to
cybersecurity weaknesses. In short, the only winning move for
information-sharing legislation is not to play.120

120. WAR GAMES (United Artists June 3, 1983) (quoting the War Operation Plan Response,
or Joshua, computer system: “The only winning move is not to play”).

